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Abstract 
 
This study analyzes capital flows to least developed countries (LDCs) to understand their 
determinants and persistence. The study finds that macroeconomic stability, trade openness 
and financial sector development are the key determinants of capital flows (both official and 
private) to LDCs. Regional variation and economic size also matter for capital flows. While 
economic size is positively associated with official capital flows (external loans and grants), 
it is negatively associated with FDIs. The study does not find any link between capital 
inflows and institutional quality or political environment in LDCs, as opposed to the findings 
of some recent studies on emerging and developed countries. The results suggest for 
appropriate policies aimed at improving macroeconomic and financial environment with 
further liberalization of trade policies in order to ensure more capital flows to LDCs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Brussels Program of Action (BPoA) underscored the need and ways to enhance least 
developed countries (LDCs)1 share in global trade, FDI and financial flows during 2001-2010 
in order to foster economic growth and development in these countries (Commitment no. 5; 
May 2001). A review of performance of these countries in the external front has highlighted 
that LDCs commitments in the BPoA largely remains unfulfilled (BIDS, 2010; UNESCAP, 
2000). Recent global financial crisis makes the LDCs vulnerable to external shocks because 
of their higher reliance on exports and dependence on aid and external debt. Even though 
developed countries committed to disburse more than 0.2 percent of their GNP as official 
development assistance (ODA) to developing countries during the decade, it was also not 
fulfilled (UNCTAD Report, 2006). Moreover, there is a fear that aid flows would shrink 
further in the face of recent recession in developed countries. It is therefore desirable for less 
developed countries to formulate proper policies and take actions to attract more capital flows 
(both private and official), which depends on understanding of the underlying factors 
influencing capital flows in these countries.   
An important feature is that net and gross capital flows to LDCs is on a rising trend in 
the first half of 2000s as compared to the 1990s (Figure 1). How this rise of capital flows to 
LDCs can be explained? The rising trend of capital flows is supposed to be related to a 
country’s underlying capital and financial structure. The objective of this article is therefore 
to identify the factors that influence capital flows to this group of developing countries, and 
examine how persistent they are.    
A widespread view holds that foreign direct investment, portfolio equity, and external 
debt in a country’s external finance are important determinants of economic performance, 
and to some extent, propensity to crises. Then, what are the determinants of capital flows? 
Recipient countries receive funds for investment which are not normally available from 
domestic sources, while investing countries receive a higher return than that of the developed 
world. In this context, interest rate differentials could explain capital flows. On the other 
hand, official funds from donor agencies or countries are available only when receiving 
                                                
1 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are defined based on the following 3 criteria: (i) Low-income criterion 
based on a three-year average estimate of the gross national income (GNI) per capita (under $750 for inclusion, 
above $900 for graduation), (ii) Human resource weakness criterion involving a composite Human Assets Index 
(HAI) based on indicators of: (a) nutrition; (b) health; (c) education; and (d) adult literacy, and (iii) Economic 
vulnerability criterion based on indicators of the instability of agricultural production; the instability of exports 
of goods and services; the economic importance of non-traditional activities (share of manufacturing and 
modern services in GDP); merchandise export concentration; and the handicap of economic smallness. There 
are now 49 countries in the LDC group. 
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countries could fulfil certain conditions, such as improvement and liberalization of their 
financial sector, privatization, good governance and macroeconomic stability.  
It is apparent in the empirical literature that while a set of studies focus on the 
determinants of capital flows, other sets of studies focus on the persistence of capital flows. 
From analytical perspective, these two issues imply dynamic characteristics of capital flows. 
Moreover, proper care is necessary to encounter endogeneity bias in explaining capital flows. 
If the dynamic capital flows are analyzed in a static model, it will not provide an unbiased 
assessment of the factors associated with capital flows. This study thus takes into account of 
these problems in estimation by applying the Arellano-Bond GMM dynamic panel regression 
model to capital flows to a panel of 48 LDCs (the list are given in the Appendix-II) for the 
period 1991-2006. The GMM estimator considers the explanatory variables and the 
difference of the lagged dependent variables as instrument in the level equation. The lagged 
dependent variable is the instrument in the first-difference equation. Hence, the Arellano-
Bond GMM estimator provides unbiased estimates of coefficients by encountering both 
persistency and endogeneity issues in the model. 
There are two important qualifications of this paper. One, it estimates the persistency 
effect of capital flows—whether capitals are temporary or irreversible as well as its 
determinants. Second, this study considers capital flows to a particular group of countries 
(LDCs), which need greater capital flows for enhancing their economic development. It is 
important to assess the determinants of capital flows to these countries as the group is diverse 
(e.g., natural-resource endowed, land-locked, island etc.) as well as level of economic 
development varies substantially among these countries. While some of the LDCs receive 
greater capitals, but others do not. Why? This study attempts to provide some answers to this 
question.    
The findings of this study suggest that macroeconomic stability, trade openness and 
financial sector development are the general determinants of capital flows to LDCs. While 
FDI flows were natural resource seeking in LDCs in the 1990s, these have turned to 
efficiency-seeking in the 2000s. Results suggest that FDIs often goes to LDCs that are 
relatively less developed. On the other hand, official capital flows (loans and grants) are 
found to be associated with the relatively higher level of economic development of LDCs. 
The study does not find any link between capital inflows and institutional quality, as opposed 
to the findings of some recent studies for emerging and developed countries (see, for 
example, Faria and Mauro, 2009).  The GMM estimators suggest that while gross capital 
inflows in LDCs are persistent with varying degrees, however, net capital flows are less 
4 
 
persistent (persistent effect is 0.14), implying limited capital flows for financing development 
activities in LDCs.     
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on capital flows. 
Section 3 describes the data, presents the empirical strategy, and reports the main results and 
the robustness tests. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Review of literature on capital flows  
Capital flows to developing countries can be classified into four broad categories: (i) 
portfolio equity flows consisting of bond and equity (i.e. developing country company share 
purchase); (ii) commercial bank lending from developed to developing countries; (iii) FDI, 
physical investment by non-residents to developing countries; and (iv) Official flows 
consisting aid, grants, concessional and non-concessional credits given to developing 
countries by donor agencies and countries. Among these four types of capital flows, first two 
are less relevant to LDCs because of their underdeveloped financial sector and capital market. 
In the cases of most LDCs, there are restrictions in place on foreign commercial bank 
borrowing as well as portfolio investment, particularly from the fear of crisis due to sudden 
reversals. However, FDIs and official flows are two major sources of capital flows to 
developing countries. 
Many previous studies have sought to identify the determinants of capital flows 
including FDI flows. Studies based on interest rate differentials provide evidence that such 
differentials could explain capital mobility only among developed countries (Montiel, 1993). 
In contrast, both net and gross capital flows to developing countries respond to economic 
fundamentals, official policies and financial market imperfections. In a cross-section of 40 
advanced and developing countries, Alfaro et al. (2008) find that institutional quality is a key 
determinant of total capital flows. In a panel of advanced and developing countries, 
Albuquerque (2003) finds the share of FDI in total flows to be negatively and significantly 
associated with good credit risk ratings, but unrelated to indicators of institutional quality. 
Contrastingly, in a cross-section of advanced and developing countries, Hausmann and 
Ferna´ndez-Arias (2000) consider the determinants of the share of FDI flows in total flows, 
using averages for 1996–98, and find no relationship with institutional quality. In a gravity 
model of bilateral FDI stocks (drawn from OECD data) and bank loan stocks ( drawn from 
BIS data) applied to a common sample of about 10 source countries and 20 recipient 
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countries, Wei (2001) finds that weaker institutions are associated with less FDI and more 
bank loans.  
In a recent cross-section study, Faria and Mauro (2009) find that equity-like liabilities 
as a share of countries’ total external liabilities are positively and significantly associated 
with indicators of educational attainment, openness, natural resource abundance, and 
institutional quality. Regarding the nature of capital flows, Sarno and Taylor (1999) show 
that equity, bond, official flows are relatively less persistent than bank credit and FDI flows. 
This finding is important from the perspective of sudden stops and reversals of capital flows. 
Empirical investigation of the relationship between economic and institutional 
indicators and countries’ capital flows has reached a variety of results. In a cross-section of 
countries (including advanced economies), Hausmann and Ferna´ndez-Arias (2000) 
document no relationship or a negative relationship between the ratio of FDI inflows to total 
private capital inflows and institutional quality. In contrast, Wei (2000a,b; 2001) and Wei and 
Wu (2002) find that weak institutions tilt capital inflows toward bank loans and away from 
FDI, consistent with their hypothesis that foreign direct investors are less likely to be bailed 
out than are foreign banks in the event of a crisis.  
Other studies have identified a number of additional factors that may influence FDI.
 
Such factors include human capital, natural resources, economic size, and openness. Human 
capital may act as a stronger ‘‘pull’’ factor for FDI (Borensztein et al.,1998) than other forms 
of capital such as portfolio equity or debt. Natural resources may also attract FDI to a greater 
extent (Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias, 2000; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001b). Larger 
economic size (proxied by measures such as total GDP) also attracts FDI, which provides an 
opportunity to better serve the local market (possibly circumventing trade barriers). Finally, 
openness may reduce the need for ‘‘tariff hopping’’ FDI, though countries having quota-free 
market access of products may be an attractive destination for FDI, which may be called 
‘efficiency-seeking’ FDI.  
3. Empirical analysis  
This section briefly describes the data, presents the empirical strategy, and reports the results. 
Appendix-I describes the data sources and variables in greater detail.  
3.1 Data sources and variables used  
The objective of this study is to examine the determinants of external liabilities and 
capital flows to LDCs. Hence, the following three dependent variables are considered: (i) net 
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capital (credit) flows (also termed as official flows), (ii) net FDI inflows, and (iii) total 
external debt. Net financial flows are disbursements of loans and credits less repayments of 
principal. It included concessional, non-concessional and other types of financial flows. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other 
long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Total external 
debt is debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total 
external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term 
debt, IMF credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original 
maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars. The data covers the period 1991-2006. Therefore, external debt includes bank 
borrowing also. We could not analyze private equity flows due to lack of sufficient data. 
This study considers the explanatory variables following Faria and Mauro (2009). The 
explanatory variables include the size of the economy (total GDP in U.S. dollars at constant 
2000 prices), the level of economic development (GDP per capita in U.S. dollars at constant 
2000 prices), openness (sum of imports and exports over GDP), the relative importance of 
natural resources (share of exports of fuels, metals, and ores as a ratio of merchandise 
exports), human capital (percentage of population over 25 that has attended some secondary 
schooling), financial development (private credit to GDP or M2 to GDP),an index of 
institutional quality and indices of political system and legislative electoral competitiveness 
(LIEC).  
The institutional quality is the simple average of six institutional indicators drawn 
from the World Bank governance indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2006): voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. In the full country sample of 
Kaufmann et al. (2006), each index ranges between -2 and 2 for the vast majority of 
countries, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Instead of simple averaging of the 
six subcomponents, one could consider extracting a common component (for example, the 
first principal component obtained by applying principal components analysis to the six 
series). This yields essentially the same results in other studies.  
Except institutional data, the source of data, in most cases, is the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank. The sources and definitions are discussed in the Appendix-I in 
greater detail. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study.  
The focus of our analysis is on the least developed countries. Therefore, the whole 
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sample consists of 48 countries (out of 49) defined as LDCs by the United Nations2. In 
addition, two groups of countries, namely African and Asian LDCs are analyzed separately. 
The reason for looking at both samples separately is twofold. First, LDCs in two regions are 
characterized by diverse geo-political and economic conditions. Some Asia-Pacific LDCs are 
land-locked and island countries, which are highly vulnerable to external shocks because of 
their dependence on highly concentrated exports and tourism. On the other hand, some 
African LDCs have been suffering from civil war, which are vulnerable to domestic real 
shocks. Second, the bulk of FDIs in Africa is of the resource-seeking type, while FDI directed 
towards Asian LDCs is mostly efficiency and quota-seeking. Hence, such grouping of 
countries will help control heterogeneity within developing countries of the same region in 
the analysis.  
3.2 Estimation techniques  
For estimating capital flows to LDCs, a dynamic panel GMM estimator has been 
applied. The reason is that a generalized method of moments (GMM, or difference GMM) 
estimator can encounter endogeneity problem as well as short-panel bias. Arellano and Bond 
(1991) make a first-difference to the panel data and then use the endogenous (or 
predetermined) lagged variables’ levels to instrument for the transformed lagged dependent 
variable. The lagged levels provide little information about the first differences when the 
underlying series are relatively stationary and, therefore, are weak instruments (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). To overcome the problem, Arellano-Bover and 
Blundell-Bond GMM employs additional moment conditions based on the lagged variables’ 
first differences (in addition to their levels) to increase the efficiency of the estimation. 
Therefore, to increase the efficiency of the estimates as well as to capture dynamics of capital 
flows, the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond GMM model has been applied in the analysis. 
 
3.3 The results 
 
The determinants of capital flows—net FDI flows, external debt (gross capital flows) 
and net capital flows are reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5 respectively. The Arellano-Bond 
GMM estimates show a clear sign of persistence in capital flows to LDCs. Based on the 
Sargan (1958) test statistic, the optimal lag is found to be two years in most cases. The 
                                                
2 One LDC, Tuvalu has been dropped from the Sample because of unavailability of sufficient data. 
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explanatory variables and the difference of the lagged dependent variable are used as 
instruments in the level equation—the lagged dependent variable appears as instrument in the 
first-differenced equation. Thus, each explanatory variable appears in the instrument matrix. 
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator tests for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. The model 
introduces first order serial correlation. The test for no second-order serial correlation of the 
disturbances of the first-differenced equation is important for the consistency of the GMM 
estimator. In addition, the Sargan (1958) test for the joint validity of the moment conditions 
(the presence of over-identification) is crucial to the validity of GMM estimates. As the 
results show, there is first order serial correlation, but no second order serial correlation. 
Further, the Sargan (1958) test implies that the instruments used are orthogonal to the error 
term, that is, over-identification is rejected. 
We begin by focusing on the determinants of the net FDI flows to LDCs in the whole 
sample for the whole period, and sub-periods: 1991-2000 and 2001-2006 (Table 3). The 
results show that net FDI flows are moderately persistent—the effect is 0.45 indicating that 
last year’s net FDI inflows will amplify current FDI inflows by 45 percent. For the whole 
sample, financial development, proxied by domestic credit to GDP ratio, and trade openness 
(total export and import to GDP ratio) are positively and significantly associated with FDI 
inflows to LDCs. Inflation rate and per capita GDP are negatively and significantly 
associated with FDI inflows. Thus, FDI inflows are associated with macroeconomic stability 
and lower level of development. The results are consistent with Faria and Mauro (2009) and 
Hausmann and Ferna´ndez-Arias (2000). 
Natural resource is positively and significantly associated with FDIs in the 1990s, but 
negatively and significantly associated in the 2000s. This result indicates that while FDIs 
were natural resource-seeking in the 1990s, it has turned to efficiency-seeking in the 2000s in 
the cases of LDCs. A separate analysis of African LDCs is done by separating natural 
resources into two sub-components: fuel export and ore & metal export. The result reveals 
that in addition to the significance of financial development, economic development, inflation 
and openness, the coefficient of ore and metal export (a proxy for natural resource) is also 
significant at 10 percent level implying its importance in determining FDI flows to African 
countries.  However, for the Asian LDCs only economic size (measured in terms of real 
GDP) matters for FDI inflows. The persistent effect of FDI inflows in Asia is found to be 
lower than Africa, indicating that FDIs in Africa are more of physical investments type and 
largely irreversible.  Thus, regional variation exists in the case of FDI inflows. No significant 
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association was found with FDI inflows and institutional quality and human capital, which is 
also consistent with Hausmann and Ferna´ndez-Arias (2000).   
As expected, external debt or gross official capital flows are found to be highly 
persistent in all model specifications—the persistent effect is about 0.60 (Table 4) implying 
their effect is strong. While total gross capital flows is positively and significantly associated 
with economic size (GDP), it is negative and significant for Africa but positive and 
significant for Asia. Financial development is positively, significantly and fairly robustly 
associated with the total gross capital flows in all model specifications. Openness, inflation 
rate and real exchange rate volatility are significant, indicating that macroeconomic stability 
and trade liberalization policies may be crucial for receiving more external debts. Natural 
resource abundance is negative and significant to total external debt, indicating that countries 
having natural resources are relatively less reliant on external loans or grants. Official flows 
are pertinent to LDCs having no or less natural resources in contrast to FDI flows.  Again, 
human capital, institutional quality and political institutions are not found to be significant to 
gross official capital flows. 
Finally, persistence and determinants of net capital flows are examined (Table 5). 
While net capital inflows are significantly less persistent for the whole sample period (0.14), 
it is not found to be significantly persistent for the sub-periods. Thus, in net terms, the flows 
of capitals to LDCs are restrained implying limited scopes of external financing for 
development activities in these countries. It is therefore important for LDCs to understand the 
determinants of net total capital flows. Net capital flows are found to be significant to 
economic size (GDP), financial development, low RER volatility, and natural resource 
abundance. Trade openness, human capital and institutions are not significant to net capital 
flows. Comparing results between net FDI flows and net capital (official credit) flows, it is 
clear that net official flows, in contrast to FDI flows, are associated with sound 
macroeconomic environment and the relatively higher level of economic development of 
LDCs. 
The robustness of the results is tested in a number of ways. Instead of considering 
levels of the dependent variables, we run regressions considering their ratios to GDP. 
However, results (significance of the variables) remain the same. The results remain almost 
the same even when some of the outlier cases are deleted. Alternative variables are used, 
particularly for human capital (proportion of people having tertiary education, or secondary 
enrolment rate), financial development as well as some interaction variables with governance 
indicators (institutional quality). These modifications have not changed the overall results.  
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To summarize the findings, although there is an evidence of sharp expansion of capitals 
to LDCs (more than 60% annually) in gross terms, it is only 14 percent in terms of net 
figures. The result indicates that LDCs are constrained by external financing for 
development, although official capital flows appear to have been more useful for the 
development of LDCs. The determinants of both gross and net capital flows are found to be 
the same—macroeconomic stability, financial sector development, and to a lesser extent, 
trade openness and natural resource abundance. Since all LDCs do not have the same level of 
natural resources, maintaining macroeconomic stability and continuous efforts for developing 
the financial sector could be an important policy options for LDCs in order to receive more 
capitals in a sustainable manner.  
4. Conclusion 
This study provides some explanations to the question of why some LDCs receive 
more capitals than the others. Although there is an evidence of sharp expansion of capitals 
(Official capitals such as external loans and grants plus FDIs) to LDCs (more than 60% 
annually) in gross terms, it is only 14 percent in terms of net figures. The results indicate that 
LDCs are constrained by external financing for development. Relatively bigger LDCs receive 
more official capitals than the smaller LDCs. On the other hand, smaller LDCs receive 
relatively more FDIs than the bigger LDCs.  It is also observed that FDIs to LDCs has turned 
to efficiency-seeking in the 2000s from its nature of natural resource seeking in the 1990s.  
The determinants of both gross and net capital flows are found to be the same—
macroeconomic stability, financial sector development, and to a lesser extent, trade openness 
and natural resource abundance. The study, however, could not find any relationship between 
capital flows and institutional quality in LDCs. Since all LDCs do not have the same level of 
natural resources, policies aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability including viable 
balance of payment situation, and financial sector development with further liberalization of 
trade regime could be an important strategy for LDCs to receive more capitals for financing 
development.  
The findings of this study reveal the fact that the determinants and nature of capital 
flows vary with the level of development, even among the LDCs. While some developing 
countries may have comparative advantage to attract some capitals for natural resource 
endowment, others attract due to their advantage on export potentials and market size. 
Particularly those are not natural resource-endowed, this paper suggests that they have to 
develop a sound macroeconomic environment with a reasonably good financial sector to 
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attract capitals in terms of FDIs or official assistance. Thus, it seems difficult to draw a “one-
size-fits-all” policy solution for even developing countries in order to attract more 
international capitals. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: averages 1991-2006 
  Maximum Minimum Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
Coeff. of 
Variation N 
Net Capital inflows 
(million US dollar) 678.00 -58.50 63.10 22.30 101.00 1.60 816
External Debt (million 
US dollar) 20500.00 29.10 3240.00 1750.00 4000.00 1.23 718
Net FDI inflows 3530.00 -1300.00 117.00 18.30 327.00 2.79 702
GDP (const., 2000, 
US$) 65400.00 32.00 3720.00 1660.00 7240.00 1.95 689
GDP per capita 
growth 90.07 -47.08 1.63 1.78 8.27 5.07 705
Institutional Quality 0.66 -2.20 -0.59 -0.55 0.54 -0.92 816
Openness 275.23 1.53 69.27 59.89 38.05 0.55 665
Natural resource 99.69 0.00 24.12 8.02 30.61 1.27 251
Political System 2.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.76 1.81 782
LIEC 7.00 0.00 5.27 6.00 2.08 0.40 782
Financial 
Development 
(M2/GDP)(1) 753.98 2.07 33.78 23.99 51.15 1.51 672
Financial 
Development 
(Credit/GDP) (2) 1255.16 -27.34 33.21 15.94 95.50 2.88 669
Inflation rate 98.2 -9.62 11.9 7.32 15.5 1.30 549
Notes: The whole sample consists of 48 LDCs for the period 1991-2006; the classification of countries according to the 
United Nations.  Net capital flows, net FDI flows and external debt data are from WDI CD ROM of the World Bank. Net 
financial flows are disbursements of loans and credits less repayments of principal. It included concessional, non-
concessional and other types of financial flows. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Total external debt is debt 
owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly 
guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all 
debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars.  The institutional quality index is the simple average of six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al.(2006), also 
known as World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI): voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. GDP (U.S. millions of dollars at 
constant 2000 prices) and GDP per capita (U.S. dollars at constant2000 prices) are from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI). Financial development is measured by domestic credit divided by GDP, from the WDI. 
Natural resource is the ore, metals and fuels export as percent of merchandise  exports, from WDI. Openness is the sum of 
exports and imports divided by GDP, built using data from the WDI. Human capital is the share of population over 25 that 
attended at least some level of secondary schooling, from the World Bank’s Education Indicators, EDSTATS. 
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Table 2: Pairwise correlations of variables: averages 1991-2006 
  
Net 
capital 
inflows 
External 
debt FDI GDP  
GDP per 
capita  
Institutional 
quality Openness 
Natural 
Resource
Political 
System LIEC 
Financial 
Development 
(M2/GDP)(1)
Financial 
Development 
(Credit/GDP)(2) 
External Debt 0.49*** 1.00                     
FDI 0.07** 0.36*** 1.00                   
GDP  0.67*** 0.74*** 0.25*** 1.00                 
GDP per 
capita 
-
0.19*** -0.17*** 0.30*** -0.06 1.00               
Institutional 
Quality 0.02 -0.27*** 
-
0.21*** -0.12*** 0.05 1.00             
Openness 
-
0.29*** -0.28*** 0.18*** -0.22*** 0.50*** 0.08** 1.00 
Natural 
resource -0.04 0.15*** 0.22*** -0.02 0.16*** -0.45*** 0.10 1.00         
Political 
System 0.07** -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.42*** 1.00       
LIEC 0.08*** -0.05 0.03 -0.07* 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.49*** 0.81*** 1.00     
Financial 
Development 
(1) 
-
0.09*** -0.09*** -0.08** -0.04 0.00 -0.07* 0.20*** -0.14*** 0.01 -0.02 1.00   
Financial 
Development 
(2) -0.07* -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08** -0.21*** 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.90*** 1.00 
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Table 3: Determinants of net FDI inflows 
  1991-2006 1991-2000 2001-2006 
All Africa (1) Africa (2) Asia All All 
Lagged FDI flows 0.45 (0.05)*** 0.45 (0.06)*** 0.45 (0.06)***          0.28 (0.12)*** -1.05 (0.08)*** 0.37 (0.07)*** 
GDP  13.64 (10.16) 17.22 (21.5) 20.54 (21.53) 14.16 (5.76)*** 51.31 (15.6)*** 9.41 (21.98) 
Per capita GDP -3.78 (2.25)* -4.27 (2.58)* -4.62 (2.6)* -2.24 (4.6) -4.40 (1.79)*** -6.95 (5.06) 
Inflation -0.18 (0.06)*** -0.17 (0.07)*** -0.17 (0.07)*** 1.85 (1.47) -0.26 (0.04)*** 0.42 (0.99) 
RER volatility -0.002 (0.06) -0.01 (0.07) -0.01 (0.07) -0.15 (0.12) -0.06 (0.10) 0.02 (0.09) 
Financial Development 8.40 (3.96)** 10.94 (4.84)*** 11.63 (4.84)*** 2.01 (3.45) -0.84 (3.7) 0.92 (5.7) 
Openness 4.16 (1.18)*** 4.52 (1.48)*** 4.52 (1.48)*** 5.08 (1.09)*** 6.72 (2.7)*** 
Natural resource 0.68 (1.26) 0.96 (1.41) 2.20 (0.95)*** -8.35 (3.6)*** 
Human capital 4763.32 (4558) 8107 (7758) 9146 (7785) 2051 (2321) -579.65 (5732) -2091 (9372) 
Fuel export -1.62 (2.19) 
Ore and metal export 2.95 (1.8)* 
Institutional Quality -22.41 (77.27) -4.89 (99.37) -4.89 (99.37) 14.62 (85.91) 53.97 (47.57) -141.03 (214.8) 
Political System 4.19 (66.1) -11.54 (79.40) -11.54 (79.40) -10.84 (54.97) 114.47 (237.9) 
LIEC -6.75 (12.19) -9.88 (13.99) -9.88 (13.99) -3.83 (9.76) -26.88 (34.48) 
Constant -0.67 (5.8) 1.88 (7.67) 1.88 (7.67) -0.26 (4.32) 13.53 (6.30) 20.54 (18.87) 
Sargan Test [χ2] 397.25*** 319.35*** 317.11*** 134.46*** 118.24*** 181.36*** 
Autocorr. (1) 
Autocorr. (2) 
Autocorr (3) 
Autocorr (4) 
N 
-10.24*** 
-0.29 
- 
- 
422
-9.18*** 
-0.22 
- 
- 
336
-9.23*** 
-0.15 
- 
- 
336
-4.89*** 
0.49 
- 
- 
111
-6.20*** 
-3.76*** 
3.61*** 
-0.20 
177
-7.49*** 
-0.56 
- 
- 
187
Notes: 1.****, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 2. For Asia, some variables are dropped due to their sensitivity to over-identification of the model. 3. The whole sample 
consists of 48 LDCs for the period 1991-2006; the classification of countries according to the United Nations.  Net capital flows, net FDI flows and external debt data are from WDI CD ROM 
of the World Bank. Net financial flows are disbursements of loans and credits less repayments of principal. It included concessional, non-concessional and other types of financial flows. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Total external debt 
is debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of 
IMF credit, and short-term debt. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Data are in current U.S. dollars.  
The institutional quality index is the simple average of six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al.(2006), also known as World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI): voice and 
accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. GDP (U.S. millions of dollars at constant 2000 
prices) and GDP per capita (U.S. dollars at constant2000 prices) are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Financial development is measured by domestic credit 
divided by GDP, from the WDI. Natural resource is the ore, metals and fuels export as percent of merchandise  exports, from WDI. Openness is the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP, 
built using data from the WDI. Human capital is the share of population over 25 that attended at least some level of secondary schooling, from the World Bank’s Education Indicators, 
EDSTATS. 
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Table 4: Determinants of external debt (Gross capital inflows), 1991-2006 
  1991-2006 1991-2000 2001-2006 
All Africa (1) Africa (2) Asia All All 
Lagged external debt 0.67 (0.05)*** 0.62 (0.06)*** 0.64 (0.06)*** 0.25 (0.08)*** 0.55 (0.08)*** 0.69 (0.11)*** 
GDP  52.32 (19.03) -72.50 (42.2)* -85.09 (42.6)** 113.0 (16.26)*** -23.72 (40.45) 124.0 (51.65)*** 
Per capita GDP growth -3.78 (2.25)* 4.28 (5.12) 6.77 (5.12) 1.83 (11.74) -2.51 (5.41) 2.58 (9.94) 
Inflation -0.03 (0.14) -0.15 (0.15) -0.15 (0.15) 7.53 (3.8)** -0.03 (0.12) 1.58 (2.14) 
RER volatility -0.31 (0.14) -0.34 (0.12)*** -0.32 (0.12)*** -0.58 (0.32)* -0.18 (0.35) -0.22 (0.16) 
Financial Development 13.68 (4.8)*** 8.32 (5.16)* 8.40 (5.16)* 17.24 (4.4)*** -1.32 (5.15) 29.85 (11.58)*** 
Openness 4.16 (1.18)*** -1.82 (3.10) -2.32 (3.05) 0.36 (2.82) -7.50 (5.37) 
Human capital 4763.32 (4558) 10989 (15213) 6507 (15103) -421 (16536) 20745 (19414) 
Natural resource -5.24 (2.56)** -3.99 (2.76) -0.96 (2.77) -17.61 (7.01)*** 
Fuel export 3.18 (4.29) 
Ore and metal export -6.57 (3.5)** 
Institutional Quality 137.73 (164.02) 261.75 (199.5) 231.09 (200.58) 86.19 (22.34) 106.76 (149.92) -48.65 (420) 
Political System -88.35 (135.7) 14.76 (153.7) 2.69 (154.02) -81.65 (121.86) -338.06 (409.6) 
LIEC 18.48 (26.07) 24.18 (26.74) 20.44 (27.31) -17.67 (28.79) 45.92 (65.91) 
Constant -31.6 (12.13)*** -22.26 (16.12) -18.17 (16.30) 15.75 (11.13) -8.54 (17.63) -98.98 (36.71)*** 
Sargan Test [χ2] 420.30*** 358.12*** 352.7*** 118.02* 120.33 193*** 
Autocorr. (1) 
Autocorr. (2) 
Autocorr. (3) 
Autocorr. (4) 
N 
-5.68*** 
-0.72 
- 
- 
434 
-5.19*** 
-0.25 
- 
- 
336
-5.21*** 
0.16 
- 
- 
336
-7.30*** 
0.54 
- 
- 
115
-8.05*** 
-2.00** 
-0.10 
- 
218
-4.71*** 
1.02 
- 
188
Notes: 1.****, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 2. See footnotes of Table 3 for  definitions of variables. 
16 
 
Table 5: Determinants of net capital inflows, 1991-2006 
  1991-2006 1991-2000 2001-2006 
All Africa (1) Asia All All 
Lagged net capital flows 0.14 (0.05)*** 0.11 (0.06)*** 0.15 (0.09)* 0.08 (0.08) 0.13 (0.08) 
GDP  3.41 (1.95)* 14.93 (5.84)*** 5.20 (1.8)*** -4.44(4.57) 14.89 (4.04) 
Per capita GDP growth 0.53 (0.58) 0.41 (0.58) 0.86 (1.75) 0.51 (0.67) 0.26 (0.94) 
Inflation 0.009 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.13 (0.56) 0.002 (0.02) 0.02 (0.33) 
RER volatility -0.02 (0.01)* -0.02 (0.01)** -0.04 (0.04) -0.04 (0.04) -0.04 (0.02)** 
Financial Development 1.19 (0.54)*** 1.64 (0.55)*** 0.005 (0.63) 1.12 (0.64)* 0.74 (0.99) 
Openness 0.06 (0.29) 0.25 (0.31) -0.20 (0.33) 0.66 (0.53) 
Human capital -742.43 (1119) 680 (1534) -1465 (1957) -724 (1689) 
Natural resource 0.86 (0.32)*** 0.92 (0.33)*** 1.04 (0.35)*** 0.50 (0.64) 
Institutional Quality -21.72 (18.51) -19.38 (21.3) -11.6 (32.6) -0.24 (18.59) -55.08 (38.92) 
Political System -7.73 (13.7) -5.01 (14.81) -15.4 (13.7) -24.55 (33.92) 
Constant 1.31 (1.26) -0.24 (0.32) -1.90 (1.63) -2.38 (2.03) -1.29 (3.52) 
Sargan Test [χ2] 233.98*** 176.03*** 112.85* 65.25*** 138.23*** 
Autocorr. (1) 
Autocorr. (2) 
N 
-13.48*** 
0.66 
400 
-11.40*** 
0.63 
308 
-8.44*** 
1.02 
115 
-7.00*** 
0.08 
218 
-7.56*** 
0.25 
182 
Notes:1. ****, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 2. See footnotes of Table 3 for  definitions of variables. 
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Figure 1: Average trend of capital inflows, 1991-2006 
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Appendix I: 
 
A. Dependent variables:  
Net FDI inflows, external debt and net capital inflows are used as dependent variables. Data are 
taken from World Development Indicators (WDI), the World Bank. The values of the variables are 
expressed in million dollars. 
 
 
B. Independent variables:  
Institutional quality index  
Simple average of six institutional indicators (voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption), 
drawn from Kaufmann et al. (2006), for all available years between1991 and 2007. The institutional 
quality index in a given year is formed only for countries that have information for all governance 
indicators in that year. Each institutional indicator is modeled by the authors as a standard normal 
distribution (zero mean, and standard deviation one); 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/resources.htm.  
 
Gross domestic product  
Constant 2000 U.S. dollars for all available years between 1991 and 2007. Rescaled to 
millions in the regressions to make results more legible. Source: World Development Indicators, 
World Bank.  
GDP per capita  
Constant U.S. dollars in 2000 for all available years between1991 and 2007. Source: World 
Development Indicators, World Bank.  
Financial development  
Private credit divided by total GDP for all available years between 1991 and 2007. Source: 
World Development Indicators, World Bank.  
Natural resources  
Percentage of ore, metals and fuels in total exports for all available years between 1991 and 
2007. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.  
Openness  
Sum of imports and exports divided by total GDP for all available years between1991 and 
2007. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.  
 
Human capital  
Percentage of total population over 25 that attended at least some secondary schooling. 
Sources: Barro and Lee (2001) available from World Bank Education Indicators (EDSTATS), 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/td10.asp.   
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C. Political Institutional Variables: 
 
The following political institutional variables are taken from the data on political indices 
(DPI) of the World Bank (see Beck et al. 2001). 
  
 
 
System 
                    Codes:  
Presidential 0 
Assembly-elected President 1 
Parliamentary 2 
 
Systems with unelected executives get a 0.  Systems with presidents who are elected directly 
or by an electoral college (whose only function is to elect the president), in cases where there is no 
prime minister, also receive a 0.  In systems with both a prime minister (PM) and a president, the 
following factors are considered in order to categorize the system: 
a) Veto power: president can veto legislation and the parliament needs a supermajority to  
override the veto. 
b) Appoint prime minister: president can appoint and dismiss prime minister and/or other 
ministers.  
c) Dissolve parliament: president can dissolve parliament and call for new elections. 
d) Mentioning in sources: If the sources mention the president more often than the PM then this 
serves as an additional indicator to call the system presidential (Romania, Kyrgyzstan, 
Estonia, Yugoslavia). 
The system is presidential if (a) is true, or if (b) and (c) are true.  If no information or ambiguous 
information on (a), (b), (c), then (d). Countries in which the legislature elects the chief executive are 
parliamentary (2), with the following exception: if that assembly or group cannot easily recall him (if 
they need a 2/3 vote to impeach, or must dissolve themselves while forcing him out) then the system 
gets a 1.   
 
Legislative Indices of Electoral Competitiveness (LIEC): 
 
     Codes:    
No legislature 1 
Unelected legislature 2 
Elected, 1 candidate 3 
1 party, multiple candidates 4 
Multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats 5 
Multiple parties DID win seats but the largest party  received 
more than 75% of the seats 
6 
Largest party got less than 75% 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
Appendix-II: List of sampled 48 LDCs across regions 
 
Africa (33) Asia (14)* Latin American and 
Caribbean (1)
Angola 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Djibouti 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gambia, The 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Lesotho 
 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Cambodia 
Kiribati 
Lao PDR 
Maldives 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Solomon Islands 
Timor-Leste 
Vanuatu 
Yemen, Rep. 
 
Haiti 
*Tuvalu has not been considered due to lack of sufficient data. 
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